As before, it has not yet been possible to include the 2nd division and the chance distributions (with market comparison!) for the first three places. Perhaps one should be prepared for the fact that it cannot be arranged for the whole season. It would be envisaged, but….
1) The 1st Bundesliga
a. Review of the matches
Results of the 3rd matchday
Borussia Mönchengladbach – VfL Wolfsburg 4:1 (3:1)
FC Bayern Munich – Hamburger SV 5:0 (3:0)
Borussia Dortmund – 1.FC Nürnberg 2:0 (0:0)
FC Augsburg – TSG Hoffenheim 0:2 (0:1)
VfB Stuttgart – Bayer Leverkusen 0:1 (0:1)
Werder Bremen – SC Freiburg 5:3 (2:1)
1.FC Köln – 1.FC Kaiserslautern 1:1 (1:1)
FSV Mainz 05 – FC Schalke 04 2:4 (2:0)
Hannover 96 – Hertha BSC 1:1 (1:0)
General assessment:
If the fear was expressed last week that the (bad) referee example would set a precedent and the decisions would go much more against the attackers, this foresight received plenty of nourishment, but on the other hand neither the disallowance of goals nor the multitude of stopped attacking actions with raised flags for no apparent reason (offside? Foul play? The one man won? Foul play? One man simply waves, the other blows the whistle), nor the numerous decisions to interpret every fall of an attacker in the penalty area as a swallow, nor the unbelievable number of “shot” hands of the defenders in the penalty area, where for heaven’s sake no penalty can be given for (!; almost O-Ton SÄMTLICHER Berichterstatter) all together could not ensure that the flood of goals was suppressed. It hailed, and plenty of it.
Well, on the subject of “examples that set a precedent”. An assistant on the touchline was, almost by the term “assistant” as opposed to the former “linesman”, granted a higher competence, a greater possible influence, a more participation in the action. He has something to say. And he makes ample use of this “right”. It almost becomes a kind of customary right. One learns from one’s predecessors. One sees in what way one can influence everything without being called to account for it afterwards, and behaves accordingly.
If some very critical remarks follow here, they are in no way meant to be interpreted in the direction of “manipulation”. Although referees (and assistants) have long been identified as the greatest possible weak point in this sense (and have certainly been, are or will be responsible from time to time), a different focus should be set here. It is about a rarely encountered, so little accepted, yet so convincing argument: psychology. What made this (or that) person act the way he did? Honourable intentions are assumed here, a basic prerequisite, so to speak (in the case of manipulation, the conclusion would be simple, the only question would be whether the prerequisite is given; even for this, a psychological excursus would be worthwhile, which, however, has no place here, at least for today).
If now the experts on Sky 90 talk in the studio after the match (better: after ALL matches) (by the way, for all the really smart NON-Sky subscribers, it also happened on DSF-Doppelpass), what the referee saw in the disallowed goal in Hannover 96 – Hertha BSC, score 1:1, 88th minute, this is the completely wrong question. And now, again, please bear with the author. You have to digress a little further.
Caution, digression!
The game was 1-1. The equaliser for Hertha was somehow deserved, yes, you can say that. They had really played a good game, although Hannover were perhaps nevertheless the slightly better team over the 90 minutes (of course, one always takes into account, equipped with the home advantage, which does exist, whether triggered by spectator support, by defence of one’s own territory, as in grey, rather warlike prehistoric times, by {minimal} referees influenced by the masses {much rather this archaic}, by not having to travel as opposed to DOCH, by familiarity of the circumstances, pitch conditions or whatever: There is it) Hertha had worked hard for this 1:1 and also skilfully earned it, after a longer, fruitless run, over the 80th minute. Minute.
Now comes another Hannover action, the long free kick, the ball touches down in the penalty area, no player really gets to the ball, the goalkeeper is nevertheless overcome, cannot stop the ball. Of course, this is such a tried and tested free-kick variant, which in its own way is always extremely dangerous: the ball SHOULD go towards the goal, the attackers run in, the defenders with them, someone can touch, deflect the ball, the goalkeeper must be prepared for anything. If no one touches – just as dangerous. That’s how it was: the ball was in, Hanover rejoiced.
Now you can see just from the reaction of the players that there is not the slightest shadow of a doubt. They cheer immediately, because that is the winning goal. They don’t even glance at the assistant (or prick up their ears, because of the expected, possible whistle), not at this “goal”. It was too clear, there’s nothing to complain about.
Of course, there was horror when the assistant’s eyes fell on the whistle and the depressing referee gestured “the goal doesn’t count”, pointing to a free-kick spot. Horror among the players, on the coach’s bench, among the fans – and among the attentive follower of football, without a fan passion for a team, but as a pure lifelong football observer, with all the accompanying suffering because of the rape of this sport. It simply could not be, it was not allowed to be.
The free kick was given, the goal didn’t count, there was no going back. If the ref later went and apologised for the mistake, it has no meaning or impact whatsoever, especially if one is truly interested in the causes of this (and every other such, recently gigantically rampant) decision. What caused the ref to disallow the goal?
Sure, mentioned here was the little back story that most certainly plays a role: if Hannover had spent the last 30 minutes (for example) energetically pressing for the winning goal and had already had one or two clear chances, one or two unclear penalty situations (all of which were of course not given; what does “unclear” or “critical” mean anyway? There were none. That’s how it starts. Afterwards, there is a discussion about whether one should not have done so …), one or two unclear offside decisions, and then the identical situation would have occurred, in which case he would certainly – according to the audacious claim – have allowed the goal. It’s obviously not about what you see as a referee. It’s about whether you can justify that decision (ANY) and of course, last but not least, whether you will be prosecuted for it, whether you have to fear negative consequences for your career. “Go with the flow” is the magic formula. Maybe that’s why or because of that you become a referee. People with backbone? Well, that’s nasty…
Well, this one has a small influence: the previous history in the game, You can observe it umpteen times that referees at the first critical situation in the penalty area decide to stand up, play on, at the second again, but at the third, even if it is much less clear, decide on a penalty kick. It’s almost like the old motto of the football pitch: three fouls – one penalty. That is the truth, one should only be allowed to speak it (even in an official position). Actually, everyone who has dedicated his life to this game (as the supposed experts pretend to do or have certainly done in part) should know such a truth. Very, very rarely do you hear an argument in this direction. An example? The famous “concession decision”. Even the sacred reporters come to the conclusion (although here, of course, they claim even more cheekily that they simply rolled the 437 dice when choosing the next phrase to be applied; “This smells like a concession decision”; there is no need to think about it, and it can be proven. Well, after the 163987526th attempt, one must conclude: it is due to the lack of ability. IT MUST.).
Nevertheless, there is another reason. But still no time to say it. Further back story, this time of a slightly different kind: the linesmen used to get a flag in their hands. They were marginal figures. They were not supposed to be visible at all and not necessarily recognisable. They had to raise the flag here or there to indicate an infringement (offside!) or a ball out, and that was it. You also lived in a world where self-actualisation (and self-expression!) was not yet central. Being the centre of attention was not everyone’s cup of tea, but it did not seem desirable for everyone either. Today, politics is different. If you have the chance, you have to take it. “Here, I’m somebody too.”
At first it seemed tantamount to discrimination to dismiss such an important person as a “linesman”. The judge over the lines. Yes, what does he have to say, what role does such a person play? No, he had to be upgraded and henceforth be called an “assistant”. Yes, the upgrading is initially only in the designation. The referee and his (almost equal) assistants.
In combination with the fact that he was given this (name) upgrading, he was also gradually given more rights. Reporting an infringement, a foul in his vicinity. Reporting an offence, assault not even near him! Radio contact with the referee with which he could draw attention to something. But this is decisive: you have to somehow manage to get into the limelight. That the decisive change in thinking. Collective feeling of inferiority, which is best combated by “representing something”. Now sociology is not a special field and the arc is certainly stretched a bit too far. But: partial cause – anyone is welcome to think about it and doubt it – certainly: it seems to have acquired a higher value to get into the headlines or the spotlight.
What does this mean for the assistant? Well, an observation made over a longer period of time is this: if you do NOT raise the flag, do NOT call an off-ball and do NOT call an infringement, then of course you do NOT get into the spotlight. That is virtually an undecision. And anyone can make it, anyone could have made it, no, even more: anyone HAS made it. Thinking like this: “I COULD report something here. But I only attract attention if I do it. NOT if I do NOTHING — -even if it would be right.” “Thinking” is too much to say It is more intuitively driven. But it is behind it.
One will observe many times in modern times (and has done for a long time on this side of the keyboard) that the assistants raise the flag at every critical off-ball. “Oh, that was close”, he says to himself, next: “here’s my chance”, and “I have the competence, I have the chance to influence” followed by “here, look, I’m playing too, I have something to say: that one was out!” It doesn’t matter whether he was or not: flag up, then the camera comes. Anyone could do nothing. Decisions are called for, not undecisions, those are for wimps: “Oh yes, was he out or was he not out? I don’t know. I’d rather do nothing.” That’s how he would be looked at, that’s how he would have to think about himself, that’s how he would be judged. “He’s not doing anything. Hey, kid, have you been paying attention at all?” “Yes, here, I was paying attention, it was off, off OFF OFF!!!!”
By the way, if you look afterwards and see that he made a mistake, then he succinctly says: “Oh, it wasn’t off at all. Wrong decision, but it was also difficult.” That’s right, whenever it’s difficult, you indicate something. One has nothing to fear.
Now, the continuation of this consideration is, of course, also with offside situations. You ALWAYS indicate. On the one hand, one has then played along, on the other hand, one protects oneself from the mistake FOR the goal. Because such a goal is still considered decisive. The goal is at most a mistake, but has not decided anything. And, as you can see, the game remained a draw. The (wrongly recognised, if it could have been proven) goal would have been decisive, especially at 1:1 (of course, there is a mistake here in the attention, but it is understandable; if you wanted to, the mistake of the unrecognised, correct goal against Hannover was even bigger, because it took away two points from Hannover, while Hertha would have only forfeited one; only an argumentation with would-have, if and but is a little recognised, popular one; how quickly one would be a millionaire, if this one stupid word did not exist).
So, yes, why has he now raised the flag? It has long been the case that the assistants permanently intervene in situations. Theoretically, he could have (should have, could have) indicated offside, if it had been one. But no player was offside. If he wanted to indicate a foul, this would be nonsensical in itself, because he would in no way be closer to the “scene of the crime” (what should have been, what kind of “crime”?). So what would prompt him to frantically wave the flag here?
Gradually, one gets closer to the matter. There has long been a problem of competence. Who is responsible for what? This might still be solvable. In any case, the assertion that a stoppage of play is only triggered by the referee’s whistle is simply wrong. The raising of the flag is equivalent to a whistle.
This circumstance is absolutely ridiculous and not enshrined in the rules (and should not be, please, please), but it is the common practice. When an assistant raises the flag, the players (usually those engaged in defensive work) have the right to abruptly stop their efforts. The goalkeeper no longer holds the shot, lets it roll through, the defenders turn away from the attacker, let him run and allow it, nobody has anything to do any more, except perhaps to show the ref the raised flag. “The flag is up, you MUST whistle.”
This is truly customary law and really no one could afford, no ref in the world, to overrule this. So: the assistant waves. At that moment he doesn’t care why he does it or what he would have to explain afterwards, what he would have seen. He is protected in every way. Because officially he would invoke the fact that the referee makes the decisions and that although he saw something, it is up to the referee to react to it or not. Proof of this: the referee apologised to Hanover, after all he blew the whistle (this is still the official version), not the assistant. If you ask the referee why he did it, he would be just as outspoken. He would say that since his assistant had shown him an infringement of the rules, he naturally stopped the game.
To cap it all: Neither of the two officials has been comfortable enough to comment. Why should they? Yes, it was a mistake, it happened and it’s human, sorry. But: what did he see or think at that moment? No need to take a stand on that. Especially since one would only have the chance: to hear nonsense or nothing at all. In any case, not the truth. “Raising the flag was a reflex. A lot of people have been doing that lately. Nothing happens. Nothing at all. Besides, the draw was fair. (The assistant said). “I didn’t see anything irregular. But since my assistant indicated something, I HAD to blow the whistle. That’s what everyone does.” (According to the referee). Fine out and protected are all. The referee, however, got a 6 in the “kicker” as a very severe punishment. Oh dear. That hurts. In addition, it says “unsafe”. He is already scheduled for next week.
By the way, the authors have been thinking about this offside problem for a long time (long before the assistants were upgraded), because of the competence disputes (which don’t even exist, but which were/are nevertheless explained here). It is also about constructive suggestions (the most constructive of which was that of the Americans at the 94 World Cup in their own country: in case of doubt, FOR the attacker), so let them be introduced.
The problem is this: the assistant, who has to stand on the defender’s line if possible, should of course always have the best view of whether a player is offside. If he notices this, he should preferably be able to indicate it (whether by raising the flag or otherwise; there would certainly be intermediate solutions). However, his perspective is in no way based on whether a player plays an active or a passive role in the situation. In practice, however, it looks like he MUST help decide this.
The consequence of this strange division (having to judge situations that one cannot; not because of ability but because of perspective) was, practically speaking, the following: ALWAYS raise the flag as early as possible. That’s the way it is today. There are always shots on goal that are blocked and then sunk by an attacker. To be on the safe side, the assistant nowadays often raises the flag BEFORE the shot is taken, in the certainty that an attacker would surely stand too far in front and possibly block the goalkeeper’s view OR sink the rebound To avoid the danger of having to make an even more difficult decision later on, one simply indicates offside (or actually: no matter what, anything; see above). The referee blows his whistle, everything is fine. No one gets prosecuted, let the experts puzzle for a while WHY we intercepted.
Well, the topic is constructive: the consequences of the practice were obviously that more and more regular actions are disallowed for inexplicable reasons (by the way, this is what “kicker” said on Monday about the Hannover goal). Constructively, definitely this: thinking pro goals is thinking pro the sport of football. This must first be made clear.
Observation this: Fans are turning away more and more. They want to see THEIR MANSION (win). But they do NOT want to just watch FOOTBALL because it is such a beautiful, exciting game. But it would be if there were more goals, if everyone thought pro goals. Spectacle (Werder 5:3) whenever there are goals, that’s when the sports fan listens, that’s what he wants to see, that’s what everyone wants to see, that’s fun.
As soon as that was internalised, any interpretation of the rules would be easy. “I wasn’t sure if it was offside, if there was a foul on the striker, if the striker really stopped the ball with his arm or if the man was offside when he shot. That’s why I gave the goal.”
No one to cry out? Keep it up! Oh, ah, ah, I overlooked: everything jumped up: “You weren’t sure AND THEN ANNOUNCED the goal? No, off to the desert with you! Not like that!”
Maybe one day we will succeed in finding a hair in every goal? Then the dream goal would be achieved: all games 0:0. The ultimate justice. That no one goes? Oh, too bad. But it could have been a nice game… 22 men, a ball you move with everything but your feet. Why the boxes at the end? Hmm, we forgot, somehow there used to be…? No, I don’t remember.
Actually, the sport should be called “non-handball”, shouldn’t it? Before listing everything else? Calf-upper thigh-hip-head ball? Ooch ne idea.
No, I didn’t take anything, why would you think that?
The table situation
Sp S U N Pkt T GT Diff
1 Borussia Mönchengladbach 3 2 1 0 7 6 – 2 +4
2 Hannover 96 3 2 1 0 7 5 – 3 +2
3 FC Bayern Munich 3 2 0 1 6 6 – 1 +5
4 FC Schalke 04 3 2 0 1 6 9 – 6 +3
5 Werder Bremen 3 2 0 1 6 7 – 4 +3
6 Borussia Dortmund 3 2 0 1 6 5 – 2 +3
7 TSG Hoffenheim 3 2 0 1 6 4 – 2 +2
8 FSV Mainz 05 3 2 0 1 6 6 – 5 +1
9 Bayer Leverkusen 3 2 0 1 6 2 – 2 +0
10 VfB Stuttgart 3 1 1 4 4 – 2 +2
11 VfL Wolfsburg 3 1 0 2 3 4 – 5 -1
12 1.FC Nürnberg 3 1 0 2 3 2 – 4 -2
13 Hertha BSC 3 0 2 1 2 3 – 4 -1
14 FC Augsburg 3 0 2 1 2 3 – 5 -2
15 1.FC Kaiserslautern 3 0 2 1 2 – 4 -2
16 SC Freiburg 3 0 1 2 1 6 – 9 -3
17 Hamburger SV 3 0 1 2 1 3 – 10 -7
18 1.FC Köln 3 0 1 2 1 2 – 9 -7
79 79 0
Total number of games 27
Goals ø 2.93
After all, two teams ahead that the computer (and with it the author; or vice versa?) has supported. Gladbach already showed an outstanding performance in the first game in Munich and were able to carry it over. The draw against Stuttgart on matchday 2 also came after a lead, so it could even have been the maximum score.
Hannover missed the jump to the top. Reason? Oh, a long story…
Cologne played a super game and played with so much heart and passion that the victory would have been much more deserved than the stated chance ratio of 6:4 expresses. So Steffen Freund also said a very clever sentence in the Sky discussion afterwards: “Cologne had more chances, and the better ones.”
The “kicker” always gives a chance ratio, but does not write (long gone; what blissful times when there were still REAL GAME REPORTS; 28th minute: Chihi free through, can cross, tries himself – and fails at the far post.”) which situations are meant. It is rather “weighed”, that is the impression here, and not counted. For example, if there is a triple chance – shot, rebound, re-shot, blocked again, re-shot again — then it only counts as one. But this does not correctly reflect the size of the chance. Cologne were classy and thus proved their league credentials. Of course, this does not say whether they will stay in. I only mentioned this because they were practically written off after matchday 2.
By the way, the Lauter players later admitted the clear superiority of Cologne – and there was neither an “if”, nor a “but”, let alone a “would have”…
Now the focus has shifted to HSV: can they keep the class? A completely silly question on matchday 3. Remember Gladbach in the pre-season. And this time at least it’s clear where all the water is flowing down to: the Elbe.
b. The title question
Explanation: these figures are the result of a computer simulation, which is based on the current playing strengths of the teams given below. The games are simulated individually on the basis of likewise calculated goal expectations (also given in the further text) and in each case the final table is considered to determine the winner.
Team Number of German champions in 5000 simulations Championships in percent Fair odds as reciprocal of probabilities
FC Bayern Munich 2375 47.50% 2.11
Borussia Dortmund 1467 29.34% 3.41
Bayer Leverkusen 377 7.54% 13.26
FC Schalke 04 183 3.66% 27.32
Hannover 96 138 2.76% 36.23
Werder Bremen 136 2.72% 36.76
VfL Wolfsburg 72 1.44% 69.44
Borussia Mönchengladbach 71 1.42% 70.42
FSV Mainz 05 64 1.28% 78.13
TSG Hoffenheim 55 1.10% 90.91
VfB Stuttgart 47 0.94% 106.38
Hertha BSC 6 0.12% 833.33
1.FC Nuremberg 6 0.12% 833.33
Hamburger SV 3 0.06% 1666.67
1.FC Cologne 0 0.00%
1.FC Kaiserslautern 0 0.00%
SC Freiburg 0 0.00%
FC Augsburg 0 0.00%
5000 100.00%
It is logical that Bayern continues to pull away. The 5:0 not only brings the goal credit in the table, no, there is also a (later made visible) greater increase in playing strength, which of course has a positive effect. The computer recommendations falter slightly. But even if he realises that Bavaria are the best, there is still the question of the probability of the favourite actually prevailing. He still remains, let’s call it “sceptical”, at under 50%. It is, although the biggest, still an “outsider’s chance”, as one would have to call any under 50%. The “normal case” is that the over 50% one occurs. So: according to the computer, Bayern normally does NOT become champion. A beautiful nonsense, isn’t it? Should we also call this verbal logic computer logic?
Change in chances compared to the previous week due to the results of match day 3
Team Win/loss absolute compared to previous matchday Win/loss in per cent
FC Bayern Munich 306 6.12%
FC Schalke 04 51 1.02%
Werder Bremen 28 0.56%
TSG Hoffenheim 17 0.34%
Borussia Mönchengladbach 14 0.28%
Bayer Leverkusen 7 0.14%
1.FC Cologne 0 0.00%
1.FC Kaiserslautern -1 -0.02%
FC Augsburg -2 -0.04%
SC Freiburg -3 -0.06%
Hertha BSC -6 -0.12%
1.FC Nuremberg -9 -0.18%
VfB Stuttgart -20 -0.40%
Hamburger SV -21 -0.42%
Borussia Dortmund -74 -1.48%
FSV Mainz 05 -85 -1.70%
Hannover 96 -90 -1.80%
VfL Wolfsburg -112 -2.24%
0 0.00%
At least we now have the chance to explain another phenomenon. This is: if the favourite is already ahead and wins, then it usually achieves a higher increase. Sure, on the one hand this is due to the high victory with the increase in playing strength, but on the other hand it is also due to the fact that he is generally the favourite. In phases that become more important (not now), victories by the competition are often of no use as long as the favourite wins his own games: the gap still increases in terms of percentage.
Confirmation of the phenomenon at the other end of the table: Hannover play 1:1. Certainly not a disastrous result. Nevertheless, it is devastating in terms of their title chances. They naturally recruit their slim chances from winning their own games – especially against opponents who are clearly beatable. If they lose, the supposedly still good chances are lost in a flash.
Wolfsburg as a big loser, not surprisingly, with a 1:4 defeat, which not only costs points but also (more) playing strength (than a close result).
Mainz are also among the losers, there is no doubt about that. Dortmund’s big loss, on the other hand, is due to the Bayern phenomenon. In addition, of course, to the fact that only those who have a lot can lose a lot. In relation to their previous chances, they have of course lost far less than Stuttgart, for example, but such a ratio statistic is not included now.
c. The title chances in the development
In principle, it is limited (for the time being, and even with that it could soon be over if Bayern wins continue) to the duel of the two big ones. Will anyone else get involved? We shall see… For the time being, Bayern shares are on the rise, which, translated into the betting market, means that you have to pay a lot for them in order to get little dividend in the end (and even that is still written in the stars).
d. Matching stock odds with the betting exchange betfair
Back Lay Probability (Back)FC Bayern Munich 1.66 1.68 60.24%
Borussia Dortmund 4.6 4.8 21.74%
Bayer Leverkusen 17.5 18 5.71%
VfL Wolfsburg 70 75 1.43%
Hannover 96 85 110 1.18%
Werder Bremen 75 90 1.33%
FC Schalke 04 26 27 3.85%
Hamburger SV 450 690 0.22%
VfB Stuttgart 60 80 1.67%
FSV Mainz 05 85 250 1.18%
Borussia Mönchengladbach 44 50 2.27%
TSG Hoffenheim 70 90 1.43%
1.FC Nuremberg 800 0.13%
1.FC Cologne 580 0.17%
SC Freiburg 600 0.17%
Hertha BSC 710 0.14%
1.FC Kaiserslautern 700 0.14%
FC Augsburg 910 0.11%
103.10%
It remains the same: the chances are assessed higher on the market than by the computer. Here – in the figurative sense, i.e. the reciprocal – there are about 60.24% title chances, compared to the 47.5% recognised by the computer. On the betting market, therefore, they would even be a real favourite, although one would have to restrict (and in another sense expand) one’s thinking to the extent that one says: “Will Bayern do it or won’t they?” (and not, for example, “If not Bayern, then who?”, because to the latter question one would now have to say, “No, and certainly not someone else”). You could also put it this way: every Bayern opponent doesn’t care who becomes champion, the main thing is not them.
So far, however, the market has behaved better than the computer. There is also a theory in initiated circles (which can even be used intuitively): since they were NOT champions last year, they will be this time. Behind this is the following, rationally well comprehensible consideration: somehow the favourite, when tickled (and they were!) still has a little bit more to offer, which is not available to the outsider.
You can tell, as a reader, can’t you? The author is trying to gradually put his computer’s missteps in a somewhat friendlier light.
But, as a long-time companion and partner often liked to say? There are things between heaven and earth that cannot be explained….
The changes in betfair’s odds estimates
Probability (Back)
FC Bayern Munich 4.99%
Borussia Dortmund -3.26%
Bayer Leverkusen 0.71%
VfL Wolfsburg -1.51%
Hannover 96 -0.36%
Werder Bremen 0.00%
FC Schalke 04 -0.92%
Hamburger SV -0.55%
VfB Stuttgart -1.11%
FSV Mainz 05 -0.07%
Borussia Mönchengladbach 0.84%
TSG Hoffenheim 0.18%
1.FC Nuremberg -0.28%
1.FC Cologne -0.21%
SC Freiburg 0.07%
Hertha BSC -0.03%
1.FC Kaiserslautern -0.06%
FC Augsburg -0.14%
-1.70%
(Again, the order according to the original estimates of the ranking).
The betting market gives Bayern a lower credit, which in itself is immediately obvious: it had it right before, so there is no need for the hectic but necessary computer adjustment. Otherwise, most values are not traded at all. There are tiny betting offers (i.e.: for small money). Only they are not accepted. Maybe at Leverkusen or a high-flyer like Gladbach.
One can be curious about the development there, too.
e. Direct Champions League qualification via 2nd place
Whether this point will be included in the upcoming season is still undecided.
The probability distribution for 2nd place after matchday 3
The changes compared to the previous week:
At least there is the betting offer “placing among the first 3” on the market. It’s possible that they’ll take the trouble to include that here soon.
f. The relegation question
The distribution of relegation percentages
Note: There would also be a detailed breakdown across the individual places. Here, places 17 and 18 count as fully relegated (i.e. in total as 1, for relegated in each case, otherwise the term is “direct relegation”), and a further third of relegated teams are added due to the relegation, whereby the first division team is generally rated as 2/3 to 1/3 favourite compared to the second division team. This makes the total number of relegated teams equal to 233.33%. In individual cases, of course, it would be different in reality. So if, for example, Frankfurt were to finish 3rd in League 2 and Augsburg 16th in League 1, one could perhaps assume a balanced pairing.
Team Direct relegation (17th or 18th place) Relegation Total
FC Augsburg 42.54% 4.71% 47.25%
1.FC Köln 36.46% 4.78% 41.24
SC Freiburg 29.74% 4.47% 34.21%
1.FC Kaiserslautern 29.88% 4.04% 33.92%
Hamburger SV 19.62% 3.45% 23.07%
1.FC Nuremberg 13.08% 3.08% 16.16%
Hertha BSC 12.96% 3.01% 15.97%
VfB Stuttgart 3.42% 1.14% 4.56%
TSG Hoffenheim 2.86% 1.08% 3.94%
FSV Mainz 05 2.34% 0.87% 3.21%
VfL Wolfsburg 2.42% 0.65% 3.07%
Borussia Mönchengladbach 1.68% 0.66% 2.34%
Werder Bremen 1.24% 0.41% 1.65%
Hannover 96 0.76% 0.49% 1.25%
FC Schalke 04 0.74% 0.35% 1.09%
Bayer Leverkusen 0.22% 0.15% 0.37%
FC Bayern Munich 0.02% 0.00% 0.02%
Borussia Dortmund 0.02% 0.00% 0.02%
200.00% 33.33% 233.33%
Augsburg certainly had the very pleasing start with two draws that suggested they could play at the level. However, those were still scored out of plenty of impartiality and curiosity. “Let’s see what comes out” was about the motto of the performances. You could tell in the — incidentally watched over 90 minutes — game that they wanted to grab a point today. There was a certain expectation, so to speak, that now, in home games, they wanted to keep this or that point there after all (and not to play unabashedly on it).
A certain tension could be felt right from the start. The opponent was clearly the team that played better football. The early 1:0 played into their hands, of course, but their superiority was unmistakable. After about 50 minutes, Augsburg had let go of their tension and simply started to play football again. In that phase (until 0:2) the miracle of the equaliser could possibly have happened, but would not have been deserved overall, nevertheless the approach to real Bundesliga football was recognisable.
So: Augsburg is the weakest team. And not because they are bad, but only because everyone else is even better. If they should manage again (the famous promoted phenomenon of the first season) to regain this carefree attitude of the first games and not start to want to play results football, they can of course still provide the small surprise of staying in the league. Their chances nevertheless remain – see illustration above – the worst.
Otherwise, one only notes that HSV has moved up quite a bit in terms of relegation chances. Surely a discussion point for the week: can it really happen that the last dino also has to bite the sour relegation apple once?
When you see that the two centre-backs are new AND inexperienced in the Bundesliga (which is not the same thing), while at the same time centre-backs occupy some of the most important (if not most noticed) positions, then every HSV fan could really get scared and anxious. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that it can happen to any team that they go down to defeat against Bayern. All those who are rooting for Bayern on the European stage should bear in mind that such games can also make a decisive difference in international matches, and at the same time everyone should be grateful to see a small series of great goals (and not always focus on the negative: “How weak was HSV?”).
Who didn’t click their tongue when Robben flicked the ball over the keeper from an acute angle, with such a matter-of-factness that would only be considered arrogance if it wasn’t crowned with success. And: how many people got out of their chairs at the fantastic goal by the same player in Manchester, which meant the game went on?
(Still without drugs other than caffeine…)
The change in chances from matchday 2 to matchday 3 in terms of relegation.
Team Change in chances
Hamburger SV -12.24%
FC Augsburg -6.49%
SC Freiburg -2.55%
VfL Wolfsburg -1.30%
FSV Mainz 05 -0.69%
Borussia Dortmund 0.00%
FC Bayern Munich 0.02%
VfB Stuttgart 0.15%
1.FC Nuremberg 0.27%
Bayer Leverkusen 0.44%
Hannover 96 0.90%
1.FC Cologne 1.02%
Werder Bremen 2.14%
FC Schalke 04 2.21%
1.FC Kaiserslautern 2.36%
Hertha BSC 3.51%
Borussia Mönchengladbach 4.01%
TSG Hoffenheim 6.22%
-0.01%
The main argument against HSV is the high score, which costs them match strength. Augsburg also lost some ground due to the home defeat. At the same time, the same applies as for Bayern in the title fight: if the weakest team loses, things go downhill quickly.
g. The relegation question in development
Well, the illusion of making something plastic …
h. The point expectations and the deviations
Explanation: for each game the computer has calculated the odds for 1, X and 2. On the basis of these, a point expectation is mathematically calculated for each team per game according to the formula probability of winning * 3 points + probability of drawing * 1 point. The deviations given below compare the points actually achieved with those expected by the computer.
In total, the deviation does not have to be 0 for all teams, as the number of expected draws does not have to be congruent with those that have occurred (nor can it even be), but an imbalance is forced by the three-point rule. Too many points scored means that there were too few draws.
Team Name Points scored Deviation Deviation absolute1 Borussia Mönchengladbach 3.27 7 3.73 3.73
2 TSG Hoffenheim 3.27 6 2.73 2.73
3 Hannover 96 5.05 7 1.95 1.95
4 FC Schalke 04 4.26 6 1.74 1.74
5 FSV Mainz 05 4.34 6 1.66 1.66
6 Bayer Leverkusen 4.60 6 1.40 1.40
7 Werder Bremen 4.79 6 1.21 1.21
8 VfB Stuttgart 4.14 4 -0.14 0.14
9 1.FC Nürnberg 3.19 3 -0.19 0.19
10 Borussia Dortmund 6.28 6 -0.28 0.28
11 FC Bayern Munich 6.41 6 -0.41 0.41
12 VfL Wolfsburg 4.00 3 -1.00 1.00
13 Hertha BSC 3.22 2 -1.22 1.22
14 1.FC Kaiserslautern 3.81 2 -1.81 1.81
15 FC Augsburg 3.84 2 -1.84 1.84
16 Hamburger SV 3.09 1 -2.09 2.09
17 SC Freiburg 3.42 1 -2.42 2.42
18 1.FC Köln 3.74 1 -2.74 2.74
0.29 28.55
ø Deviation 1.59Gladbach, of course, in front here too. It can hardly be otherwise, at such an early stage (who should have overachieved more, behind them in the overall table but ahead of them in THIS table?). On the other hand, you can see that Hoffenheim have overachieved MORE than Hannover, even though Hannover have more points. Well, this is possible because Hannover had two home games (Hoffenheim only one), and because Hoffenheim had the stronger opponents (Dortmund among others).
In the end, Cologne remains, but Freiburg and HSV give them serious competition. HSV benefits here from having already played Bayern (which depresses their expectation).
The international comparison for the average point difference
Note: the theory is that the German Bundesliga is the most exciting among Europe’s top leagues. This finding is rather intuitively derived, but so far “accepted” both in this country and abroad. Of course, the higher goal average is an indication of this, as well as the(perceived) lower predictability when it comes to the title, relegation, but also other issues. Balance is a criterion and possibly the main reason for this.
The measure used here for the deviation in average points expectation provides measurable information about this, but it was probably a “problem” specific to the 2010/2011 inaugural season (the fan thanked) that the Bundesliga produced a particularly large number of surprises. This was reflected in the figures. Now the phenomenon can be observed further. Is the Bundesliga also exciting in this respect? More exciting than elsewhere?(At the same time, a large deviation in this category could simply mean that computers or feeders do not know their business well)
Liga 1 ø Deviation Change from previous week
Germany, 1st BL 1.59 0.33
Italy
Spain
France 1.72 -0.12
England 1.37 0.65
Germany, 2.BL 2.93 0.48
In principle, you can’t see anything in this graph. Only, if you like, this: you have to wait and see if you can see anything soon. In any case, it seems clear: the more games, the greater the deviation. So would one have to divide it by the number of games to make it comparable? Let’s think…
i. Goal expectations and their deviations
Explanation: Almost the same applies to goals as to points. The expected goals scored and the expected goals conceded are compared with reality. Too few goals scored count negatively just as too many goals conceded count negatively, the reverse counts positively in each case. Here, the sum of the deviations must be 0, because all expected and not scored goals were not conceded somewhere. However, the goal average may show a deviation.
Team Name Goal expectation Goals scored Goals conceded expected Goals conceded Total deviation1 Borussia Mönchengladbach 3.98 6 5.89 2 5.91
2 TSG Hoffenheim 3.31 4 4.59 2 3.27
3 FC Schalke 04 4.09 9 3.87 6 2.78
4 Werder Bremen 5.09 7 4.14 4 2.04
5 VfB Stuttgart 4.62 4 4.65 2 2.03
6 FC Bayern Munich 6.94 6 2.98 1 1.05
7 FSV Mainz 05 4.15 6 3.84 5 0.69
8 Hannover 96 4.94 5 3.56 3 0.62
9 Hertha BSC 3.52 3 4.95 4 0.42
10 Borussia Dortmund 5.53 5 2.35 2 -0.18
11 1.FC Nürnberg 3.23 2 4.72 4 -0.52
12 Bayer Leverkusen 4.97 2 4.27 2 -0.70
13 VfL Wolfsburg 4.01 4 4.19 5 -0.82
14 1.FC Kaiserslautern 3.93 2 4.49 4 -1.44
15 FC Augsburg 3.35 3 3.71 5 -1.64
16 SC Freiburg 3.39 6 4.46 9 -1.93
17 Hamburger SV 3.44 3 5.27 10 -5.17
18 1.FC Köln 3.92 2 4.51 9 -6.41
76.43 79 76.43 79 0.00
Goals ø expected: Goals ø scored: ø Deviation 2.09
2.83 2.93 That Gladbach is ahead HERE is not a bit self-evident (in contrast to the points expected table). After all, a team could have won by a large margin, drawn the other two games, so that they would be behind Gladbach in the real table, but would have easily passed them on over-achieving goal expectation. Well, in reality it’s a bit different: Gladbach already won in Munich (which of course equals a gigantic plus), and pulled off a sort of Kantersieg with the 4:1 against Wolfsburg. So: first place.
Cologne remains behind, remember the 1:5 last week and before that the 0:3 against Wolfsburg. As you can also see, Dortmund is even just below expectations, whereas Bayern, thanks to the 5:0, are of course in the plus, even if only by one goal.
Also for this statistic the foreign comparison:
Place Country League 1 ø Goal difference Change from previous week.
1 Germany, 1.BL 2.09 0.35
2 Italy 1
3 Spain 1
4 England 1 1.90 0.73
5 France 1 1.79 0.00
6 Germany, 2.BL 3.73 0.22
The same probably applies here as to the point expectation deviation in international comparison. The increase in the values seems normal and inevitable (and not due to computer misjudgements).
j. The playing strength ranking
Note: Playing strength is measured in goals expected against the average team (which does not exist in practice). There is offensive strength, which is measured in expected goals scored, and defensive strength, which is measured in expected goals conceded. The quotient of these two values is the measure of playing strength. The more expected goals scored, the higher the value; the fewer expected goals conceded, the higher the value.
Goal expectations
Team For Against Quotient For/Counter Shift1 FC Bayern Munich 2.04 0.99 2.06 +1
2 Borussia Dortmund 1.70 0.86 1.98 -1
3 Bayer Leverkusen 1.62 1.19 1.36 +0
4 FC Schalke 04 1.48 1.24 1.19 +1
5 Werder Bremen 1.64 1.46 1.12 +2
6 VfL Wolfsburg 1.44 1.30 1.11 -2
7 Hannover 96 1.47 1.35 1.09 -1
8 Borussia Mönchengladbach 1.44 1.44 1.00 +2
9 FSV Mainz 05 1.45 1.45 1.00 -1
10 TSG Hoffenheim 1.40 1.41 0.99 +2
11 VfB Stuttgart 1.55 1.57 0.99 -2
12 Hertha BSC 1.30 1.52 0.86 +1
13 1.FC Nürnberg 1.18 1.47 0.80 +1
14 Hamburger SV 1.28 1.64 0.78 -3
15 SC Freiburg 1.24 1.70 0.73 +0
16 1.FC Kaiserslautern 1.14 1.63 0.70 +0
17 1.FC Köln 1.26 1.83 0.69 +0
18 FC Augsburg 0.94 1.52 0.62 +0
25.57 25.57 +0
Goals ø expected
2.841 Bayern of course now with a lead. At the back you see (still) Augsburg and Köln. HSV with a nasty fall of 3 places.
k. The frequency of tendency changes
Note: a “change of tendency” is considered to be a goal that equalises a lead or scores a lead. The 1:0 is not counted, because without this goal it would not even begin to have anything to do with tension in the goal sequence. Every now and then, a statistical comparison is made here with other countries. This shows that there are more changes of tendency in Germany than elsewhere, which on the one hand points to perceived tension in the Bundesliga – which is possibly envied abroad – and on the other hand points to possible tactical deficiencies, which, following an old tradition, make one advise to urgently go for a second goal after a 1:0 – and not to dull and insipidly, as is usual abroad, rock this goal over time. International comparisons provide more information about the effectiveness or weakness of German behaviour.
Of course, it is and remains desirable that “something happens”, that games ripple back and forth, that teams that take an early lead still lose later on, that dramatic comebacks from two or three goals down come back, equalise or even win. The claim here: it actually happens too rarely in football. It would be desirable to allow more goals so that more drama can be added to this point as well. More goals guarantee more changes of tendency, but it is possible that there is an upper limit. So: in ice hockey there are more goals and thus more changes of tendency, no question. But are there more in handball, for example, than in ice hockey? Probably not. Because: with a lot of goals, one team can be in the lead by five, six, seven without ever thinking of a comeback by the losing team.
At the weekend there were the following changes in tendency: Gladbach against Wolfsburg had 2: the Gladbach equaliser and the lead. Spectacular (and, as you can see the proof: when there are more goals, there is inevitably more tension in terms of tendency changes; however, there might be some kind of “saturation point”) the pairing Werder – Freiburg. Freiburg took the lead, Werder equalised, took the lead themselves, Freiburg scored the 2:2, Werder took the lead again, Freiburg came back to 3:3, then, shortly before the end, the two goals (with a change of tendency): the 4:3 and the 5:3. Makes a total of 6 changes of tendency.
Cologne against Lautern the obligatory one with a 1:1, and again the Mainz game against Schalke: 4:2 after 0:2. Results in “only” two changes of tendency, but a comeback from a 0:2 is (unfairly) not rated higher than one from a 0:1. Hertha also equalised a 0:1 shortly before the end, so that all in all there were 2 + 6 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 12 changes of tendency. This will certainly put this league at the top of the international rankings once again.
Also for the tendency changes every week the international comparison:
Season 2010/2011
Country Matches Compensation HF AF Total per match
1st Bundesliga 306 158 60 49 267 0.873
England 380 198 66 46 310 0.816
2nd Bundesliga 306 145 56 41 242 0.791
Italy 380 169 58 48 275 0.724
France 380 175 49 40 264 0.695
Spain 380 146 48 46 240 0.632
A look back at last season should once again remind us of the “averages”. League 1 was far ahead, but the English Premier League had still come between League 1 and League 2.
Season 2011/2012
Country Matches Equalisation HF AF Total per match
Germany 1 27 15 7 2 24 0.889
England 19 6 1 2 9 0.474
Germany 2 45 18 7 4 29 0.644
Italy
France 30 15 2 2 19 0.633
Spain
In fact, the 1st division has already returned to 1st place internationally, but has even surpassed last season’s figure (for now). Keep it up, in terms of excitement, one can only wish. Tactically deficient? Hasn’t been evident recently. Not even in the international match against Brazil….
l. The mathematical review of the results of matchday 3.
Note: here the deviation of the expected goals with the goals scored is calculated for each match. To determine the total deviation, the values are added up in absolute terms (not visible here, this column). So: if one team deviates positively by 0.35 goals, the other negatively by -0.62, then the absolute total deviation is 0.35 + 0.62 = 0.97 goals. To determine the average deviation, all these values are added up and divided by the number of pairings – usually 9.
Goal expectation
Home Away Total Deviation
Gladbach Wolfsburg 1.32 1.33 2.65 4 1 2.68 -0.33
FC Bayern HSV 2.35 0.86 3.22 5 0 2.65 -0.86
Dortmund Nuremberg 2.02 0.65 2.67 2 0 -0.02 -0.65
Augsburg Hoffenheim 1.20 1.24 2.45 0 2 -1.20 0.76
Stuttgart Leverkusen 1.62 1.60 3.23 0 1 -1.62 -0.60
Bremen Freiburg 1.96 1.04 3.00 5 3.04 1.96
FC Cologne Kaiserslautern 1.61 1.34 2.95 1 1 -0.61 -0.34
Mainz Schalke 04 1.41 1.09 2.50 2 4 0.59 2.91
Hannover Hertha 1.86 1.11 2.97 1 1 -0.86 -0.11
15.36 10.27 25.63 20 13 4.64 2.73
Expected goal total Expected goal average Scored goal average
25.63 2.85 3.67 ø expected goal difference 1.87 ø goal difference 2.42
There was a hail of goals, the goal average thus already overachieved for the season, which for the time being calls into question the critical words of fear expressed last week. Of course, the average goal difference, which is far above the expected one, also increases as a consequence.
The home teams have scored MORE too much.
m. The determination
Note: The fixing is calculated for each match as the sum of the squares of the individual probabilities. This measures how much you can commit to a favourite in a certain pairing. The higher the favourite position, the higher the sum of the squares, but also the more “certain” the occurrence of the (favourite) event. The mathematical question in itself is even more how far one can commit, since one cannot really determine this value. Events are predicted whose probabilities are unknown. Nevertheless, one can check the quality of the estimates made here in the long term by comparing expected/occurred. This is done week by week, but of course also overall.
The determination expected
Pairing 1 X 2
Gladbach Wolfsburg 36.93% 25.52% 37.55% 34.25%
FC Bayern HSV 70.67% 17.24% 12.09% 54.37%
Dortmund Nuremberg 69.64% 19.38% 10.97% 53.46%
Augsburg Hoffenheim 35.60% 26.80% 37.60% 33.99%
Stuttgart Leverkusen 39.04% 22.89% 38.07% 34.98%
Bremen Freiburg 59.07% 21.36% 19.56% 43.29%
FC Cologne Kaiserslautern 44.05% 23.83% 32.12% 35.40%
Mainz Schalke 04 44.35% 26.17% 29.48% 35.21%
Hanover Hertha 55.21% 22.29% 22.51% 40.51%
4.55 2.05 2.40 3.65
Average expected commitment: 40.61%To reiterate, just above the expected numbers given in last week’s text. A player with below average favourites or, to put it another way, with quite even games. What did the practice bring?
The determination arrived Pairing 1 X 2
Gladbach Wolfsburg 36.93% 25.52% 37.55% 36.93%
FC Bayern HSV 70.67% 17.24% 12.09% 70.67%
Dortmund Nuremberg 69.64% 19.38% 10.97% 69.64%
Augsburg Hoffenheim 35.60% 26.80% 37.60% 37.60%
Stuttgart Leverkusen 39.04% 22.89% 38.07% 38.07%
Bremen Freiburg 59.07% 21.36% 19.56% 59.07%
FC Cologne Kaiserslautern 44.05% 23.83% 32.12% 23.83%
Mainz Schalke 04 44.35% 26.17% 29.48% 29.48%
Hanover Hertha 55.21% 22.29% 22.51% 22.29%
4.55 2.05 2.40 3.88
average determination received: 43.07%Further note: No comparable model has yet been discovered in mathematics. Not even by a mathematician who had set himself the task of proving to the author that there was definitely nothing new.
The value that arrived exceeded the expected one. There were no really big surprises either. The top favourites won their games. Since nothing has been said about the Dortmund match: when you hear the term “work victory” in the reports, this is the modern (German) paraphrase for the little word (and the fact) luck. As one learned (and did not see for oneself, only in summaries) Nuremberg had an equally large number of good chances (the “kicker”, with its absolutely unacceptable counting method, comes up with 5:5 goal chances; even if not accepted, it reflects the circumstances to some extent: it was quite even). Sometimes the conversion succeeds, sometimes not. To attribute this to Dortmund’s higher quality would be a little unfair. On the other hand, it is quite clear that you would have to see the game if Nürnberg actually managed to score the opening goal. Then a favourite could make use of its right – coupled with the (higher-quality) ability – to shift up a gear. As long as it was 0-0, you might feel like, “There’s still time, we have to be patient, A goal will come sometime.”
In any case, the result was a victory that corresponded to the “expected” outcome, according to conventional thinking (according to the author’s logic, the expected value was the reported 53.64% {defined expected}, but a higher value was achieved, namely Dortmund’s victory value of 69.64%; in this respect it was “over-expected”, so to speak; the favourite won, which according to this logic is by no means a matter of course). Bayern’s doubts were much smaller and even led to an article in the (today’s) Friday edition of the BILD newspaper saying that they were already looking for the culprits if HSV were to be relegated (so bad was the result).
Otherwise there were only the two small surprises of the draws (and although they were surprises in individual cases, the computer actually calculated 2.05 such; sum column of the expected draws). So overall the matchday has been a “favourites matchday” – and has more than lived up to that role. A little more…
n. Overall league statistics
Note: statistics of this kind are regularly compiled by computer. It is generally used for quality control of the individual figures. Each figure has its meaning and is explained in more detail. The goal average is not repeated here. The home advantage is calculated by dividing the goals scored by the home team by half of the total goals. In this way, you can see how many more goals the home teams score than they would score without home advantage. 1,116 is 11.6% more for the home team, 11.6% less for the away team.
1st Football Bundesliga 2010/2011
Statistics of the actual results Matches Home wins Draws Away wins Goals conceded Home advantage
27 12 6 9 47 32 1.190
Statistics of expected results Matches Home wins Draws Away wins Goals Conceded Home advantage
27 12.83 6.28 7.87 44.2 32.22 1.157
Statistics of absolute deviations Matches Home wins Draws Away wins Goals Conceded Home advantage
0 -0.83 -0.28 1.13 2.8 -0.22 0.03311
Percentage difference statisticsMatches Home wins Draws Away wins Goals conceded Home advantage
0 -6.92% -4.67% 12.56% 5.96% -0.69% 2.78%
Determination expected Determination arrived
39.55% 39.70%
ø Goal difference ø Goal difference expected
1.95 1.87 Note: For arithmetic foxes, here is a brief explanation of the calculation method for the expected goal deviation: The computer gives each result from 0:0 to 20:20 a probability (it is actually sufficient up to 10:10, as the rest no longer has any significant probability). There would be a goal deviation for each result. So if you multiply the probability of, for example, a 3:4 by the deviation that would then occur (in the case of the match Mainz – Gladbach, below, with goal expectations of 1.77:1.25, this would be 3 – 1.77 = 1.23 for Mainz plus 4 – 1.25 = 2.75 for Gladbach, i.e. a total of 3.98 goal deviation) and carry out this procedure for each match result, you get the expected average goal deviation.
The away wins are a little overfrequent, with a little more than one too many arriving, this is balanced at the expense of the home wins and draws, otherwise most of the values fit quite well The home teams have currently scored 2.8 goals too many compared to the expectation, but this should not worry one at all as a forecaster. Too few home wins, too many goals scored just means that the victories have been a little too high on average.
The definition of expected/achieved also does not give cause for concern, so that all in all, from a statistician’s point of view, one can be satisfied with the “forecasts” so far (which are anything but forecasts in the sense of a fortune teller).
o. Review of the betting recommendations
Pairing 1 X 2
Gladbach Wolfsburg 2.74 3.60 2.74
FC Bayern HSV 1.37 5.3 10.5
Dortmund Nuremberg 1.34 5.4 12.00
Augsburg Hoffenheim 2.82 3.45 2.62
Stuttgart Leverkusen 2.44 3.60 3.07
Bremen Freiburg 1.64 4.30 5.90
FC Cologne Kaiserslautern 2.38 3.50 3.35
Mainz Schalke 04 2.66 3.40 2.82
Hannover Hertha 2.22 3.50 3.50
Here is last week’s graph as a reminder.
Well, picked two bets, lost both. At least Mainz got a 2-0 lead (even if coach Tuchel later remarked that they took the lead “just like that”, “like a gift”, and when asked again by the baffled reporter: “We didn’t play out the lead, it just came like that.” This is very much in line with their own (authors’) thinking. Every now and then, goals simply fall without any particular explanation (and this in stark contrast to the beloved reporters who can consistently explain events logically AFTER they have occurred (above all, they WANT to find an explanation urgently; then they succeed; Dortmund lost last week because Götze was tired; that’s how it goes down in history).
Furthermore, as explained in detail at the beginning of this article, Hannover was disallowed an absolutely regular (winning) goal shortly before the end. This circumstance, however, does not make the betting recommendation a good one per se. It could only have happened if there hadn’t been that overzealous man on the line (whose representative, if he had existed, could have decided the same way). The Mainz bet is not necessarily a good one either, despite the lead. Nevertheless, Mainz still had some chances, as one tends to forget: the “kicker” comes to 8:7 in the chance ratio, which, by the way, roughly corresponds to the observed value. By the way, it was amazing that Mainz created two good chances to equalise directly after the 2:3 (Ivanschitz!). So: both bets were ok. That one did not win can happen…
Recommended bets Statistics of the individual match days
Matchday Nr Number of bets Number of hits expected hit deviation win/loss
1 7 5 2.84 +2.16 +7.96
2 7 3 2.77 +0.23 +1.75
3 2 0 1.00 -1.00 -2.00
The first time bitterly in the red….
Statistics total
Total number of bets Total number of hits Total balance G/V in% Total expected hits Total hit deviation
7 5 +7.96 113.71% 2.84 +2.16
14 8 +9.71 69.36% 5.61 +2.39
16 8 +7.71 48.19% 6.61 +1.39
Nevertheless, the overall statistics still show a significant plus as well as continuing to exceed expectations.
p. Preview of the 4th matchday
Note: The computer uses a specially developed – of course explainable and highly logical – algorithm to calculate the goal expectations (and the individually maintained home advantage not shown here) to these goal expectations. These in turn are offset against the probabilities of occurrence, in the past by simulation, today long since by a function derived from the simulation results). These goal expectancy values have also long since proved to be competitive in goal number betting on the betting market.
Goal expectation
Home Away TotalHertha Stuttgart 1.62 1.44 3.06
Kaiserslautern FC Bayern 0.91 2.01 2.92
HSV FC Cologne 1.91 1.25 3.15
Nuremberg Augsburg 1.43 0.86 2.29
Hoffenheim Bremen 1.61 1.36 2.97
Freiburg Wolfsburg 1.30 1.47 2.77
Leverkusen Dortmund 1.11 1.20 2.32
Hanover Mainz 1.66 1.19 2.85
Schalke 04 Gladbach 1.71 1.05 2.76
13.24 11.84 25.08
Expected goal total Expected goal average
25.08 2.79 Despite a flood of goals, slightly fewer goals expected than before. This must be due to the specific pairings. Above all, the computer expects a lack of goals in Leverkusen (and Dortmund still slightly ahead). No flood of goals at the other giants either: Bayern in Lautern remains under three goals (in expectation, whereas three goals would still be most likely; miraculous mathematics).
Note: The determination is calculated as the sum of the squares of the individual probabilities. This measures how much one can commit to a favourite in a certain pairing. The higher a favourite position, the higher the sum of the squares, but also the more “certain” the occurrence of the event. The mathematical question in itself is even more how far one can commit, since one cannot really determine this value. Events are predicted whose probabilities are unknown. Nevertheless, one can check the quality in the long term by comparing expected/occurred events.
The determination expected
Pairing 1 X 2
Hertha Stuttgart 42.12% 23.48% 34.41% 35.09%
Kaiserslautern FC Bayern 16.24% 20.56% 63.20% 46.81%
HSV FC Cologne 52.94% 22.01% 25.05% 39.15%
Nuremberg Augsburg 50.51% 26.65% 22.84% 37.83%
Hoffenheim Bremen 43.58% 23.79% 32.64% 35.30%
Freiburg Wolfsburg 33.60% 24.80% 41.60% 34.74%
Leverkusen Dortmund 34.00% 27.67% 38.33% 33.91%
Hanover Mainz 48.55% 23.84% 27.61% 36.88%
Schalke 04 Gladbach 52.95% 23.62% 23.43% 39.11%
3.74 2.16 3.09 3.39
Average expected commitment: 37.65A very even matchday, especially of course as two of the top three teams meet, thus neutralising each other and not appearing in other pairings where they might otherwise be clear favourites. Bayern away too, so a small expected value of fixing, which, the smaller it is, is more and more along the lines of “Anything can happen here, anyone can beat anyone.”, or, for the sceptic, the alternative way of (not) predicting: “I can’t predict anything.”
The fair odds
Note: the fair odds are just the inverse of the probabilities. However, this is how the games are offered on the betting market or traded on the betting exchanges (“betfair”). You can gladly compare what the computer guesses. The deviations will not be enormous, but theoretically every bet is a good bet (from the computer’s point of view) if the odds paid on the market are above the fair odds. “Good” is the bet insofar as it promises long-term profit. If you consistently make bets in this way, you should make a profit in the long run. Of course, there are no guarantees for this either.
Pairing 1 X 2
Hertha Stuttgart 2.37 4.26 2.91
Kaiserslautern FC Bayern 6.16 4.86 1.58
HSV FC Cologne 1.89 4.54 3.99
Nuremberg Augsburg 1.98 3.75 4.38
Hoffenheim Bremen 2.29 4.20 3.06
Freiburg Wolfsburg 2.98 4.03 2.40
Leverkusen Dortmund 2.94 3.61 2.61
Hanover Mainz 2.06 4.19 3.62
Schalke 04 Gladbach 1.89 4.23 4.27
Comparison with the betting exchange betfair
(The betting recommendations)
Pairing 1 X 2 % Average
Hertha Stuttgart 2.72 3.55 2.78 100.90%
Kaiserslautern FC Bayern 6.80 4.60 1.55 100.96%
HSV FC Cologne 1.94 3.80 4.30 101.12%
Nuremberg Augsburg 1.83 3.75 5.20 100.54%
Hoffenheim Bremen 2.40 3.55 3.20 101.09%
Freiburg Wolfsburg 2.96 3.55 2.56 101.02%
Leverkusen Dortmund 2.82 3.50 2.70 101.07%
Hannover Mainz 2.28 3.50 3.40 101.84%
At least three bets come out again this time: Hertha against Stuttgart home win, Augsburg at Nuremberg the 2, and Hannover against Mainz again the 1.
That you should play Hertha is easy for the computer. Hertha has proven itself and the home advantage has not changed that much. The market, on the other hand, “knows”: Hertha must first show that they can be dominant in a home match. Only then can the favourites’ position be justified. The own feeling: an advantage is not given. So the recommendation rather: do not bet (nevertheless, the game is marked; however, it would be absurd either to manipulate the numbers in advance or, alternatively, simply not to mark and continue normally; the reader would say: “Hey, Hertha is clearly indicated. Either you play it or you throw away your computer”; right: So it is played; it is after all only in the Moospenny…).
Augsburg in Nünrberg, on the other hand, is very serious as a betting proposition. It is the geographical proximity and Augsburg’s good showing in their first away game at Kaiserslautern that motivates this tip. Of course, one is aware that it is an outsider tip (if you want, you should focus on “Lay Nürnberg”). But it is about the ratio of probability of occurrence to paid odds. This is favourable, as is represented here.
The home win of Hannover against Mainz is also recommended with full conviction. Both were good, both failed to get the desired result last game, Hannover slightly less so, seen in this light, a home rate of well over 2.0 is always worth considering. Done, it can be played.
2) The 2nd Bundesliga
a. The standings
Please still be patient. In the first weeks, the workload was significantly higher regarding these texts. The 2nd league will be included soon, without adding a “promised”.
b. The chances of promotion
Note: the simulation of League 2 runs exactly like that of League 1. 5000 runs were also made. Third place logically gives a 1/3 chance of promotion, although it should still depend on the pairing. Since the top favourites are ahead here, it could well be 50% that the second division third place team has against the first division third last.
c. Point expectations and discrepancies
d. Evaluation of the 5th second division matchday
average determination arrived at: e. Preview of the 6th second league matchday
Maybe starting next week!
